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SOURCES OF EU LEGITIMACY 
  
   ABSOLUTE VALUES (In weber’s terms: Wert) 
LEGAL-RATIONAL  
     EU treaties and supremacy of EU law 
      Validated byprocesses conforming to EU law 
  
     EU institutions a means not an absolute end 
  
  
    INSTRUMENTAL (Zweck) 
     Collective action to deal with problems of interdependence 
Taken by collection of Elites, not We the people 
  
No longer Peace, Security as in 1950s, 1989 
  
Today: Effectiveness of Economic outputs (Scharpf) 
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SHIFTING SOURCES OF NATIONAL LEGITIMACY 
  
  
  DECLINE IN ABSOLUTE TRADITIONAL VALUES 
  
    Elites no longer free to make treaties with permissive consensus 
  
    Corporatist elites can’t deliver church members, classes, interests  
  
  
  DECLINE IN INSTRUMENTAL TRUST IN ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES 
  
    Party leaders not trusted to deliver party policies  
  
    Politicians no longer trusted as agents of voter preferences 
  
Outputs don’t match promises (cf. David Easton) 
  
  
  DEMOCRATIC INPUTS INCREASINGLY VALUED  
  
    Opinion polls report what people want 
  
    Politicians’ rhetoric reflects what people want 
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 SALIENT EU POLICIES CREATE BOTH WINNERS & LOSERS  
  
  
    MACRO-ECONOMIC VALUES HAVE MICRO IMPACT  
  
     Eurozone: Stable prices. Unemployment, especially youth 
  
     Single market: + Global market:  more competition 
  
     Macro-economic values produce some micro-losers  
  
  
  
    MACRO-SOCIETAL CHANGE IMPACTS TRADITIONAL VALUES  
  
     Free movement mixes peoples from 28 national societies 
  
     Extra-European migration increase mixtures 
  
     National societies become multi-cultural, not European 
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PRIME MINISTER HAS A GOLDONI PROBLEM: SERVES 2 MASTERS 
  
  
    Elected by and accountable for policies to national electorate  
  
  
    Ex officio member of European Council making collective EU policies 
  
     Council has legal-rational legitimacy to act 
  
     Median PM represents 2 percent of EU population;  
  
 Council has 21 small states 
  
     Accountable for decisions to 27 other PMs + Treaties 
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 REFERENDUMS: A DIRECT DEMOCRACY INPUT TO POLICY 
  
  
    About a single policy, not a package of issues in a party programme 
  
    Directly decisive without politicians, parties as untrusted intermediaries 
  
    Available at national level in 26 member states; not at EU level 
  
    Binary choices divisive not consensual 
  
     Anti-EU campaigners can invoke simple absolute values 
  
     Pro-EU campaigners may invoke macro benefits 
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NATIONAL REFERENDUMS WITH EU CONSEQUENCES SINCE 2004 
% anti-EU policy 
Mean anti-EU vote without Hungary: 56 per cent 
  
Since 2014 all six votes reject closer EU integration 
  
National democratic legitimacy challenges EU legitimacy  
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        REFERENDUMS AS INPUTS TO AN INTERDEPENDENT PROCESS 
  
         National government                                        EU institutions 
  
   
  Demand   Referendum          Majority                EU deliberation         Response 
  
  
                          <Feedback 
Votes count, resources decide.   Stein Rokkan 
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EU LEGAL-RATIONAL LEGITIMACY LIMITS REFERENDUM IMPACT 
  
EU STRATEGIES 
  
1.  AVOID policies triggering referendum 
  No Turkish membership 
  
  Differentiated integration: Fiscal Pact not subject to veto 
  
  
2.  CONCEDE  
  Beforehand in preparation for Lisbon Treaty 
  
  After referendum defeat: 
 Think again 2nd referendums Ireland, DK  
   Dutch vote on Ukraine 
  
  
3.  POSITIVE RESPONSE  
  Risk averse: Avoid challenge, kick the euro down the road 
  
  Link policies: Orban’s Hungary 
  
  Sanction by using legal-rational powers: Switzerland, UK 
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IMPLICATIONS  
 
  
  * Member states have a democracy surplus and an effectiveness deficit  
 
  * EU has a democracy deficit but legal-rational effectiveness  
 
  * In a global system of interdependence member states and EU have effectiveness deficit 
 
  
 (See R. Rose: “Responsible Party Government in a World of Interdependence”,  
         West European Politics, 2014, 37,2, 253-269).  
 
